

Reasons-Factualism and Rationality without Reasons

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Comesaña&McGrath argue against reasons-factualism by using links between reasons and rationality. Their key assumption is that in order to be rational, one must have reasons. But there are many cases in which one can be rational despite having a false belief. Since reasons-factualism cannot account for the reasons-had in these cases, reasons factualism is false. In order to deal with this issue, I want to explore a seemingly radical proposal: one can be rational without having reasons. The central idea is that we conceive of rationality as a virtue, where a virtue is simply a disposition of an agent. Rationality is a mental disposition that can be specified by means of a function that maps rationalizing considerations onto response event types such as believing that p. I will argue that reasons and rationalizing considerations need not be identical and thereby defend reasons-factualism against Comesaña&McGrath.