

Skepticism, Transmission and Factive Reasons

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Transmission failure is standardly presented as a problem for non-factive reasons (e.g., in which a non-factive perceptual state gives one grounds for belief, as when it visually appears to me that the animal is a zebra). Crispin Wright, however, argues that it is a problem for factive reasons as well (I see that the animal is a zebra). I criticize Wright's arguments, but then present a new model of transmission failure for factive reasons that does not suffer from the problems that Wright's model does. I further argue that, although there are resources for replying to this transmission-failure challenge, most of them come at the cost of any theoretical advantage for factive reasons in explaining knowledge or answering skepticism. Thus it is very hard to get factive reasons to do the work one would want them to.